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NOTES

Selective Preemption: A Preferential Solution To The
Bartkms-Abbate Rule in Successive Federal-State

Prosecutions
The United States Constitution's fifth amendment double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' The double
jeopardy clause's foundation is the belief that a second prosecution
after either conviction or acquittal threatens an individual's funda2
mental rights and impairs the administration of criminal justice.
The Constitution prohibits double jeopardy by preventing reprosecution or retrial. The Supreme Court of the United States, however,
has held that successive prosecutions 3 are not double jeopardy.
Bartkus v. Illinois4 and Abbate v. United States5 reaffirmed that

states may prosecute individuals for crimes for which they previously
stood trial in federal court, and federal authorities may prosecute individuals for crimes for which they stood trial in state court ("the
Bartkus-Abbate rule").6 The rule presupposes that the federal and
state governments are separate sovereigns protecting separate interests. 7 In practice, however, the Bartkus-Abbate rule disregards the in1

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 See J. -SINGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY (1969).
3 The term successive prosecutions as used in this note refers to both a state prosecution
after an earlier federal prosecution for crimes arising from the same facts, as in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), and a federal prosecution following an earlier state prosecution
for crimes arising from the same facts, as in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
4 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
5 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
6 The Supreme Court first held a federal prosecution following a state prosecution constitutional in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). Abbate reaffirmed Lanza and the
Barth majority used Lanzar rationale to allow state prosecutions subsequent to federal prosecutions. Until Abbate, however, courts questioned the theory that federal and state governments exercised different powers of sovereignty in prosecuting crimes ("the dual sovereignty
theory").
7 In Lanza, Chief Justice Taft reasoned:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable
of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory. . . . Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sover-
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dividual's interest in avoiding successive prosecutions, an interest
8
which in a single jurisdiction is enough to bar a second prosecution.
Carried to its logical extreme, the Bartkus-Abbate rule would permit successive prosecutions in every case involving overlapping federal and state statutes regardless of whether the context justified dual
prosecutions. In response, federal 9 and state 10 governments have limited their powers of successive prosecution by employing discretionary prohibitions.
This note will discuss the successive prosecutions problem inherent in the Bartkus-Abbate rule. Part I reviews the nature and development of the double jeopardy clause focusing on the emergence of the
Bartkus-Abbate rule; Part II criticizes the Justice Department's (the
Department) discretionary policy, "the Petite policy,"" in light of
strong Supreme Court dissents; and Part III analyzes proposed statutory remedies 12 under the assumptions that the Bartkus-Abbate rule is
good law and successive prosecutions are constitutional, and second,
that the Bartkus-Abbate rule should be overruled and successive prosecutions are unconstitutional.
eignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by
each. 260 U.S. at 382.
8 See Note, DaubleJeopardyand DualSovereignty: A CriticalAnalsis, 11 WM. & MAY L.
REv. 946, 952 (1970) (discussion on the balancing of federalism interests and individual
rights).
9 After Bartkuse and Abbate were decided, the Attorney General in a memorandum order
to all United States attorneys, published a policy restraining successive prosecutions unless an
Assistant Attorney General found "compelling reasons" to prosecute. This policy, however, is
vague, is applied too haphazardly and is unenforceable by the defendant as a defense to
-subsequent federal prosecutions. Attorney General William Rogers' memorandum is reprinted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, at 19, col. 2. See also United States v. Mechanic, 454
F.2d 849, 856 n.5 (8th Cir. 1971) (reprintedinffull).
10 ALAsKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-146 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1965); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-2-15 (Bums 1963); MINN. STAT. § 609.045
(1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 171.070 (1963);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 139 (McKinney 1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25 (West 1954); OR. REv. STAT. § 131.240(1) (1965); S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 22-5-8 (1967); TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 1323 (Vernon 1966); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-25 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.71 (West 1958).
11 The Department's policy of prosecutorial discretion in successive prosecutions got its
name from the first case to give effect to the policy, Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 259
(1960) ("the Petite policy'.
12 Part III of this note, which proposes remedies to the successive prosecutions problem,
will discuss the Model Penal Code, the New Federal Criminal Code and selective preemption.
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The Dual Sovereignty Problem

The DoubleJeopardy Clause. Its Development and Rationale

The double jeopardy clause's rationale was best stated by Justice
3
Black in Green v. United States:1
The underlying idea, one that is deeply engrained in at least the
Anglo-American system ofjurisprudence is that the state with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty. 14
The first Congress adopted the double jeopardy clause in its
present form only after considerable discussion that the provision's
text should reflect the already well-established double jeopardy principle. 15 The 1789 Congressional debates reflected this concern.'

6

The representatives at the first Congress also considered a proposed amendment to the double jeopardy clause to bar double prosecutions for the same offense only if brought under "any law of the
13 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
14 Id at 187.
15 The principle against successive prosecutions developed as a basic notion of fairness.
The double jeopardy prohibition is traceable to the Hebrew Talmud, Newman, DoubleJeopardy and the Problem of Successive rosecutions:. A Suggested Solution 34 S. CALIF. L. REv. 252
(1961), and found expression in Roman law, see 2 SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN
WORLD, 488-89 (3d ed. 1937), and Canon law, see Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 151. In 1759, Blackstone suggested that the plea of autrefoits acquit or former
acquittal, stemmed from the English common law maxim that no man may be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
335 (1790). Thus, it is not surprising that after the earliest settlers introduced the doctrine to
the United States, it has been repeatedly recognized as a fundamental principle. Today it is
found, in varying forms, in the federal Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. amend V, and in the jurisprudence or constitutions of every state, see Newman, supra note 15, and most foreign nations.
For a discussion of the history of double jeopardy and its emergence in modern law, see J.
SINGLER,

16

supra note 2.

The fifth clause of the fourth proposition was taken up viz: "No person shall be
subject, in case of impeachment, to more than one trial or one punishment for the
same offense ....
[A representative] thought... its meaning appeared rather doubtful. It says
that no person shall be tried more than once for the same offense. This is contrary
to the right heretofore established; he presumed it was intended to express what was
secured by our former constitution, that no man's life should be more than once put
in jeopardy for the same offense; yet it is well known, that they were entitled to
more than one trial. The humane intention of the clause was to prevent more than
one punishment. ...
I ANNALS OF CONG. 781 (1789).
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United States. 1 7 The rejection of this limitation on the clause indicates that Congress intended to establish a broad national policy
against federal courts trying a person after acquittal or conviction in
another court. The Supreme Court, however, later established this
limitation, as the constitutional rule in Bartkus v. Illinois1 and Abbate
v. United States. 19
B.

The Bartkus-Abbate Rule

-

In Bartkus20 and Abbate,2 1 the Supreme Court reaffirmed an important line of decisions holding successive prosecutions constitutional. 22 The Court relied on the dual sovereignty doctrine, first
24
expounded in dictum in Fox'v. Ohio23 and United States v. Marigold.
Fox and Marigold recognized that the same act might be an offense
against both the state and federal governments, and could thus be
punished by each in cases "of peculiar enormity or where the public
safety demanded [it]. .. .
The Supreme Court first authoritatively articulated the dual
17 The history of the Congressional debates and proceedings on the amendments to the
Constitution does not explain why the representatives refused this proposed amendment to
the double jeopardy clause. The Annals of Congress, however, do reflect a general concern
that the double jeopardy clause secure "the privileges of those who are prosecuted." Id at
782.
18 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
19 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
20 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
21 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
22 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), was the Supreme Court's first confrontation with successive prosecutions stemming from overlapping state and federal criminal
statutes. Houston involved whether a state court martial might try a state militia member who
had failed to answer a call to service by the United States. The Supreme Court sustained the
conviction, but its reasoning is obscure: "in cases where the state governments have a concurrent power of legislation with the national government, [the states] may legislate upon any
subject on which Congress has acted, provided the two laws are not in terms, or operation,
contradictory or repugnant to each other." Id at 24. But, it was not until the decisions of
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 470 (1847); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560
(1850); and Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852), that the Court supported the dual
sovereignty doctrine. The Court held that each citizen owes "allegiance to two sovereigns,
and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the law of either." Moore, 55 U.S. (14
How.) at 20. The rationale's overriding consideration was the balancing of state and federal
interests during a period when the dual sovereignty doctrine was a political question. See L.
MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 10 (1968).

23 46 U.S. (5 How.) 470 (1847).
24 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
25 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 484. Commentators have criticized Fox and Marigold as products
of Justice Daniel, whose judicial statements throughout his Supreme Court tenure were
marked by pronounced sentiments for the political crisis over state's rights. See MILLER, supra
note 22 at 24; Note, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 946, supra note 8, at 949.
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sovereignty doctrine in Moore v. llinois.26 Moore challenged the constitutionality of an Illinois statute prohibiting the harboring of fugitive slaves because there was a conflict between the state and federal
statutes. Moore argued that the Supremacy Clause required that the
State law yield. The Supreme Court upheld the Illinois statute, finding that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the state's police
power. More importantly, the Court stated that the state and federal
statutes were vastly dissimilar in their underlying purposes, the ac27
tual conduct proscribed, and the nature of the penalty imposed.
In United States v. Lanza 2 8 the Court held that under the dual
sovereignty doctrine, successive prosecutions were constitutional.
The Court in Lanza upheld a federal Volstead Act 29 conviction after
Washington state convicted the defendant for manufacturing liquor.30 In Lanza, Chief Justice Taft stated the classic formulation of
32
the dual sovereignty framework later cited by Bartkus3 1 and Abbate:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the
same territory. Each government in determining what shall be an
offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national
and state sovereignties is an offense against
the peace and dignity of
33
both and may be punished by each.
In Bartkus, 34 the defendant was tried under the National Bank
Robbery Act 35 for robbing a federally insured Illinois savings and
26 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852). The issue in Moore was the constitutionality of an Illinois
statute prohibiting the harboring of fugitive slaves. Moore had been convicted and fined
under the Illinois statute. Moore argued that the Illinois statute, in conflict with the federal
fugitive act, violated the federal and state constitutions, prohibiting two punishments for one
offense. The Supreme Court upheld the Illinois statute, but the constitutional objections
avoided scrutiny because the case raised only the possibility of successive prosecutions.
27 Fox, Mangold and Moore were pre-Civil War cases. The dual sovereignties issue in
those cases was inextricably entwined with the debates over the nature and scope of the concurrent powers between state and nation. The Court's reasoning then was due in part to the
political atmosphere of the time.
28 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
29 The National Prohibition Act (Remington's Codes & Stats., § 6262, as amended by
Session Laws 1917, c. 19, p. 46).
30 Based on the Volstead Act's legislative history and the eighteenth amendment, the
Lana decision was unjustified. See MILLER, supra note 22, at 34.
31 359 U.S. at 129.
32 359 U.S. at 193.
33 260 U.S. at 382.
34 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
35 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976).
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loan association. A federal district court acquitted Bartkus, but he
was reindicted on substantially the same evidence for violating the
Illinois Robbery Act.3 6 The only difference between the state and
federal statutes was that the federal law only applied to federally insured banks. Bartkus was convicted under the Illinois Robbery Act
and the Illinois37 and the United States 38 Supreme Courts affirmed
his conviction.
Bartkus' companion case before the Supreme Court of the
United States was Abbate v. UnitedStates. 39 InAbbate, a federal conviction followed a state conviction. The defendants in Abbate pleaded
guilty to state charges of conspiring to dynamite telephone company
facilities during an extended labor dispute. 4° - On the same facts, a
federal district court subsequently convicted the defendants for conspiring to destroy integral parts of a United States communication
system. 4 1 The Court also affirmed Abbate's conviction.
The Supreme Court, thus affirmed the constitutionality of successive prosecutions by state and federal governments without regard
to which trial came first or whether the first trial resulted in an acquittal or a conviction. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the major42
ity in Bartkus, concluded that "[p]recedent, experience and reason"
supported his conclusion that the defendant had not been deprived
of due process through successive prosecutions. Justice Frankfurter
reasoned that the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause was not
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and therefore did not
apply to the states43 and that dual sovereignty required a strong state
and federal justice system."
36 Illinois prosecuted Bartkus on an indictment that recited facts "substantially identical" to the federal indictment, 359 U.S. at 122, for violation of Illinois' robbery statute. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 501 (1951) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 18-1, 18-2
(Smith-Hurd 1977)). Bartkus was sentenced to imprisonment under the Illinois habitual
criminal statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 602 (1958) (repealed 1963).
37 People v. Bartkus, 7 Ill. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955).
38 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
39 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
40 Abbate and others were indicted in Illinois for violating an Illinois statute making it a
crime to conspire to damage property. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 &
Supp. 1978)). The indictment described the property as "communication facilities belonging
to Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company."
41 The federal indictment did not refer to the facilities as belonging to the telephone
company, but charged a violation of the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976),
for conspiracy to destroy parts of "systems and means of communication operated and controlled by the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976).
42 359 U.S. at 189.
43 Id at 124.
44 Id at 134.
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Recognizing that the Court's reasoning would allow two governments to do what each could not do alone, Justice Black dissented:
The court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the
same act is somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted
by the Federal Government and the other by the state. Looked at
from the standpoint of the individual who is being prosecuted, this
notion is too subtle for me to grasp. If double punishment is what 45
is
feared, it hurts no less for two 'sovereigns' to inflict it than for one.
Justice Black further argued that double prosecutions conflict with
the fourteenth amendment because they violate "the spirit of our free
46
country."
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas, also dissented in Bartkus.47 Justice Brennan predicated his
dissent solely on federal agents' intimate role in the state prosecution. 48 The state trial, he said, was "actually a second federal prosecution. '49 Justice Brennan's dissent did not attack the merits of
Bartks, however, and Justice Brennan showed that he concurred
with Justice Frankfurter when he wrote the majority opinion in
Abbate.
In Abbate, Justice Brennan, relying on Lanza, reasoned that the
same act produced two offenses. 50 Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded, Abbate was not put in jeopardy twice for the "same" offense. 5 ' Justice Black again dissented, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas. 52 Justice Black attacked Abbate for its
heavy reliance on Lanza. Lanza, Justice Black objected, had accepted
dicta of earlier cases rather than any direct holdings of the Court.
Those cases, Justice Black argued, assumed that "identical conduct"
45 Id at 155.
46 Id at 150.
47 Id at 164.
48 Justice Brennan in his dissent discussed the improper role played by the federal
authorities:
It is clear that federal officers solicited the state indictment, arranged to assure the
attendance of key witnesses, unearthed additional evidence to discredit Bartkus and
one of his alibi witnesses, and in general prepared and guided the state prosecution.
Thus the State's Attorney stated at trial: 'I am particularly glad to see a case where
the federal authorities came to see the state's attorney.' And Illinois conceded with
commendable candor on oral argument in this Court 'that the federal officers did
instigate and guide this state prosecution' and 'actually prepared this case.'
Id at 165.
49 Id
50 359 U.S. at 194.
51 Id at 195.
52 Id at 201.
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might be successively prosecuted by the federal and state governments.5 3 Because of the first Congress' rejection of the proposed
amendment to the double jeopardy clause, 54 Justice Black concluded:
I believe the Bill of Rights' safeguard against double jeopardy was
intended to establish a broad national policy against federal courts
trying or punishing a man a second time after acquittal or conviction in any court. It is just as much an affront to human dignity
and just as dangerous to human freedom for a man to be punished
twice for the same offense once by a state and once by the United
States, as it would be for one of these two Governments to throw
him in prison twice for the offense. 55 Recognizing the critical distinction between successive prosecutions where each sovereign's legitimate interests are at stake and other successive prosecutions, the
Department 56 and several states 57 adopted self-imposed limitations
upon their power to prosecute successively.
II.

Limitations on the Dual Sovereignty Problem-The Petite
Policy

Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
successive prosecutions, the Court advised authorities to exercise selfrestraint because of the potential abuses of successive prosecutions.
Therefore, just seven days after Bartkus and Abbate, Attorney General
William Rogers issued a memorandum 58 establishing the "Petite policy." 59 The memorandum stated:
53 Id at 202.
54 See text accompanying note 17 supra.

55 359 U.S. at 203.
56

See text accompanying note 9 supra.

57 See note 10 supra.
58 The memorandum was an internal order to all United States attorneys outlining the
procedure for prosecuting criminal cases where the defendant had already been prosecuted by
the state. The memorandum attempted to ensure that the Bartkus-Abbate rule would be used
sparingly. Attorney General William P. Rogers' memorandum is reprinted in the N.Y.
Times, April 6, 1959, at 19, col. 2. See also United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 856 n.5
(8th Cir. 1971) (reprinted in full).
59 The Supreme Court approved the Department's prosecutorial self-restraint policy in
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), where the Court granted the Department's motion to vacate a conviction and dismiss an indictment for suborning perjury in a deportation
hearing. The defendant in Petite had previously paid a fine and served a two month sentence
for conspiring to make the same false statements. Although both a district court and a circuit
court of appeals upheld the government's right to prosecute, the Department told the
Supreme Court that a policy against successive prosecutions for the same criminal conduct
was "dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law
enforcement." Id at 530.
The Petite Policy is published in the UNITED STATES ArrORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-2, 142
(January 3, 1980 revision) and provides:
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[N]o Federal case should be tried when there has been a State prosecution for substantially the same act or acts without the United
States Attorney submitting a recommendation to the appropriate
Assistant Attorney General in the department. No such recommendation should be approved by the Assistant Attorney General...
without having
it first brought to [the Attorney General's]
60
attention.
Attorney General Rogers also indicated that he would not approve of
a federal trial following a state prosecution "unless the reasons are
compelling."'6' This policy attempted to ensure the proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion and compliance with the Department's
'62
duty to "act wisely and with self-restraint.
The Petite policy provides prosecutorial self-restraint and recog-

nizes that possessing legal authority does not automatically require
the exercise of that authority. Yet, the Petite policy's scope and effectiveness has three limitations: (1) since the Petite policy is an internal
administrative policy it is not subject to judicial review; (2) the Department's guidelines on applying the policy are vague; and (3) defendants cannot use the policy as a defense to successive prosecutions.
A.

The Petite Poliy's Limitations

First the Petite policy guides the Department's internal affairs
only. 63 The policy, therefore, does not create any substantive or pro-

cedural rights that the defendant can legally enforce. Supreme
Court decisions speak of the policy as being activated by the governThe Department of Justice's dual prosecution policy precludes the initiation or
continuation of a federal prosecution following a state prosecution based on substantially the same act or acts unless there is a compelling federal interest supporting the dual prosecution. The policy is intended to regulate prosecutorial discretion
in order to promote efficient utilization of the Department's resources and to protect persons charged with criminal conduct from the unfairness associated with
multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for substantially the same act or
acts.
In order to prevent unwarranted dual prosecutions, the policy requires that
authorization be obtained from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General prior to
initiating or continuing the federal prosecution. A failure to obtain prior authorization of a dual prosecution will result in a loss of any conviction through a dismissal
of the charges unless it is later determined that there was in fact a compelling federal interest supporting the prosecution and a compelling reason to explain the
failure to obtain prior authorization.
60 N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, at 19, col. 2. See also United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d
849, 856 n.5 (reprinted in full).
61 Id at col. 2.
62 Id at col. 5.
63 See United States v. Frederick, 583 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Musgrove, 581 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1978).
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ment's motion. 64 Federal defendants, however, have often asserted

that the policy should be applied in their favor. 65 The lower federal
courts have uniformly rejected this view, holding that a federal defendant's reliance on the Department's Petite policy will not cause the
dismissal of a federal indictment or the setting aside of a conviction.
Absent government application, the policy confers no rights upon the
defendant, even where the United States Attorney fails to follow the
policy's prescribed procedure. The federal prosecutor must demonstrate to the Assistant Attorney General a compelling federal interest

in prosecution and obtain the Attorney General's approval to
proceed.
Defendants objecting to successive prosecutions brought without
the Assistant Attorney General's approval, have also been unsuccessful in asserting that a federal agency must adhere to its policies and
regulations. Courts have held that a letter, press release, or similar
statement by the Attorney General published in the Federal Register

which expresses policy not promulgated as a Department regulation
is simply a Department housekeeping provision not subject to judi66
cial scrutiny.
Second, the Petite policy lacks concrete guidelines for federal
prosecutors on what constitutes "compelling reasons" for a second
prosecution. 67 With ninety-three United States Attorneys, 68 differing
views exist between prosecutors and courts, regarding the meaning of
69
the Petite policy standard.
Third, federal prosecutors apply the Petite policy inconsistently
and unevenly.70 This results from the policy's vague standards 7' and
64 Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (defendant should receive the polidy's
benefit "whenever its application is urged by the government"). See also United States v.
Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1979) (Supreme Court has remanded cases because of the Petite
policy at the Department's request).
65 United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Frederick, 583
F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Musgrove, 581 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wallace, 578 F.2d 735
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971).
66 See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Annot. 51 A.L.R.
Fed. 852 (1981).
67 Former Attorney General Edward Levi stated that the policy's application proved
"both as to substance and procedure, to be difficult and puzzling." He stated that the Department "does not have much of a memory of the cases which have gone through the process." Address by Attorney General Edward H. Levi, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
(July 28, 1976). As a result, no procedure exists for ascertaining that all cases receive substantially equal scrutiny, and no criteria exist for determining what reasons are "compelling."
68 49 U.S.L.W. 3513 (1981).
69 See text accompanying note 71 infra.
70 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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the federal prosecutors' failure to uniformly review each case. 72
B.

Criticzsms of the Petite Polic/s Application

In Petite v. United States, 73 the Supreme Court directed the dismissal of an indictment in a successive prosecution brought without a
compelling reason by a federal prosecutor. 74 The Court granted the
Solicitor General's motion to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals. The Solicitor General made the motion because the federal
prosecutor violated the Department's policy against successive prosecutions. 75 Although the Per Curiam order noted that the Court
could dispose of the matter in the interest ofjustice, 76 the concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Warren and the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan 77 warned against disposing of the case without considering
its merits. Chief Justice Warren stated:
As I believe that the Court should not deny all such motions peremptorily, so do I believe that we should not automatically grant
them through invocation of the policy of avoiding decision of constitutional issues. There are circumstances in which our responsibility of definitively interpreting the law of the land and of supervising
its judicial
application would dictate that we dispose of a case on its
78
merits.
The federal courts have the authority to grant a motion vacating a
judgment, 79 but that authority is discretionary.8 0 Realistically,
though, courts rarely use that discretion to refuse a motion to dismiss
71 Id Several Department attorneys attempted to formulate concrete guidelines for
determining compelling reasons, but they were unsuccessful. See Note, The Problem of Double
Jeopardy in Successive Prosecutions.- A Fifth Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REv. 477, 483 (1979).
72 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
73 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
74 The Supreme Court directed that Petite be remanded to the court of appeals with
instructions to vacate its judgment and dismiss the indictment. The Court however, did not
review the double jeopardy question's merits.
75 361 U.S. at 531.
76 Id
77 Id at 533.
78 Id at 532.
79 The authority to grant a motion to vacate a judgment is provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2106
(1976) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). Section 2106 states:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry ofsuch
appropriatejudgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had
as may bejust under the circumstances. [emphasis added].
80 Rule 48(a) states:
The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a
dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall
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a successive prosecution."' A federal court presented with the request
to dismiss an indictment that violates not only the Petite policy but
also the spirit of the double jeopardy clause finds it hard to deny the
request despite the Government's bad faith in maintaining the
2
conviction.
In the twenty-one years since Petite, the Court has on seven occasions been confronted with successive prosecutions in violation of the
Petite policy. Each time the Solicitor General has urged the Court to
vacate the judgment and to remand the case with directions to dismiss the indictment.8 3 Thus far the Supreme Court has done so, al8
though stimulating some vigorous dissents.

4

These cases aroused deep sentiment in the dissenting judges
thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the
consent of the defendant. [emphasis added].
Congress has authorized federal courts through 28 U.S.C. § 2106 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a)
to deny the prosecutor's request to dismiss an indictment if it is "clearly contrary to manifest
public interest," Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30 (1977), or if it is an "abuse by
Executive prerogatives." Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1974).
81 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Rinaldi argued
that his prosecution violated the Department's Petite policy. The Government acknowledged
the violation and moved to remand the case to the district court to seek the indictment's
dismissal. The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to remand, United States v. Pearson, 508
F.2d 595 (1975). The district court, however, denied the motion to dismiss because the prosecutor acted in bad faith in prosecuting. United States v. Washington, 390 F. Supp. 842
(1975). In the appeal from the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit described the government's bad faith:
"In this case, an unidentified, but responsible, official within the Department authorized a federal prosecution with full knowledge that such a prosecution was forbidden by the Petite Policy. For the Government to attempt to dismiss by arguing
that no compelling reason now exists for a separate federal conviction, when the
considerations that allegedly imply a lack of 'compelling reasons' were known as
fully to the Government throughout both federal trials as now, does, for this court,
constitute bad faith." 544 F.2d 203, 208 (1976).
82 The Supreme Court, however, held that the district court had abused its discretion in
failing to dismiss. The Court found the salient issue was not whether the decision to prosecute
was made in bad faith, but whether the Government's later efforts to terminate the prosecution were similarly tainted with impropriety. 434 U.S. at 22 (1977). Therefore, despite the
provisions of§ 2106 or Rule 48(a), federal courts exercise little discretion in deciding whether
to deny a motion to dismiss an indictment. In Rinaldi the Court reasoned that because of the
Petite policy's parallel purposes and the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy,
"federal courts should be receptive, not circumspect, when the government seeks leave to
implement that policy." 434 U.S. at 29.
83 United States v. Mariscal, 49 U.S.L.W. 3513 (1981); Rinaldi v. United States, 434
U.S. 22 (1977); Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975); Ackerson v. United States, 419
U.S. 1099 (1975); Hayles v. United States, 419 U.S. 892 (1974); Redmond v. United States,
384 U.S. 264 (1966); Marakar v. United States, 370 U.S. 723 (1962).
84 United States v. Mariscal, 49 U.S.L.W.. 3513 (1981) (White, J., and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 32 (1977) (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and
White, J., dissenting); Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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against the Court's mechanical acceptance of the Solicitor General's
motion without independently examining the cases' merits. 85 Central to this debate is some Justices' concern that in "rubberstamping"
the Petite policy's application, 86 the Court exercises neither its judicial obligation to independently examine a question presented for review nor its authority to deny certiorari.8 7 Particularly unsettling to
the dissenters in Rinaldi v. UnitedStates8 8 was the majority's failure to
explain why federal courts must reverse a valid conviction because of
the government's admission of administrative error, 89 when they
have the authority to independently examine the case's merits. The
examination of the merits, the dissenters argue, is especially critical
because the decisions have precedential value and the "proper administration of the law cannot be left to the stipulation of the parties." 9 0 The dissenting justices determined that the only purpose
served by the Court's approval of the Department's internal
prosecutorial policy was emphasizing to federal prosecutors the need
85 Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Watts, argued that it was the Court's role to
review the case's merits. Giving effect to the Petite policy without reviewing the case's merits,
he reasoned, is abusing the Court's function:
[Ilt is not at all clear to me that any federal court, and particularly this Court,
should automatically conform its judgments to results allegedly dictated by a policy, however wise, which the judicial branch had no part in formulating. If these
doubts be well founded, independent judicial appraisal is required afortiori where,
as here, the policy purportedly derives from the rulings of this Court and their
spirit. The federal courts have no role in prosecutorial decisions but, once the judicial power has been invoked, it is decidedly the role of federal courts to interpret the
decisions of this Court and to assess the validity of judgments duly entered. 422
U.S. at 1036.
Justice Rehnquist, in a vigorous dissent in Mariscal wrote:
Congress has given us discretionary jurisdiction to deny certiorari if we do not
wish to grant plenary consideration to a particular case, a benefit that other federal
courts do not share, but it has not to my knowledge moved the Office of the Solicitor General from the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to the Judicial
Branch. Until it does, I think we are bound by our oaths either to examine independently the merits of a question presented for review on certiorari, or in the exercise of our discretion to deny certiorari. Because the Court exercises neither of these
alternatives here, I dissent.
49 U.S.L.W. 3513 (1981).
86 In Watts and Mariscal, the Supreme Court dismissed the indictments in violation of the
Petite policy without examining the cases' merits. 422 U.S. at 1032; 49 U.S.L.W. 3513. Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Watts and Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Marircal termed the acceptance of the Solicitor General's motion without independent examination "rubberstamping" the Government's wishes. 422 U.S. at 1037. 49 U.S.L.W. 3513 (1981).
87 United States v. Mariscal, 49 U.S.L.W. 3513 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
88 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
89 434 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90 422 U.S. at 1036 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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to apply the Petite policy consistently. 9' They concluded this purpose
was insufficient to "persuade [them] that the Court should have a
hand in nullifying such a substantial commitment of federal
'92
prosecutorial and judicial resources.
III.

Proposed Solutions to the Successive Prosecutions Problem

The Bartkus-Abbate rule balances federalism interests and defendant's individual rights: 93 it prevents one government from frustrating
the other's interests. Opponents of the rule feel the Supreme Court
should overrule Bartkus and Abbate9 4 because they are based on infirm
legal precedents. 95 They also argue that the rule's protection against
nullification does not outweigh the defendant's constitutional interThe only purpose served by the Court's action is to aid the Government in emphasizing to its staff lawyers the need for a consistent internal administrative policy.
But with all deference I suggest that is not a judicial function and surely not the
function of this Court. Neither the rulings of this Court, nor their spirit, required
that we sacrifice the careful work of the District Court and the Court of Appeals to
say nothing of the public funds which that work required-to the vagaries of administrative interpretation. If the Government attorneys who initiated this prosecution did so without consulting their superiors, that is an internal matter within
the Department of Justice to be dealt with directly by that Department, but it
should not bear on a judgment lawfully obtained. . . . The resources of law enforcement agencies and courts, once committed to a rational course of action culminating in a valid judgment, should not be dissipated without better reason. 422
U.S. at 1035.
92 Id at 1032 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93 For a view of the policy questions involved in balancing federalism interests with the
individual rights of the defendant, see MILLER, supra note 22 at 1; Note, DoubleJeopard by Stale
and Federal Governments.- Another Exercise in Federalirm, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538 (1967); Note,
Multiple Prosecution Federalism vs.IndividualRights, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 355 (1968); Note, Federa/ism and DoubleJeopardy: A Study in the Frustrationof Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306,
327 (1963).
94 See Note, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, supra note 92 at 1544; Note, Overming Barkus and
Abbate: A New StandardforDoubleJeopardy, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 188 (1972).
95 Two principles formed Bartkus' basis: (1) that the fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause is not binding on the states, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); and (2) that
dual sovereignty is applied in other areas of criminal procedure to uphold the action of federal and state officials.
The Supreme Court, however, "rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to the States only a 'watered down' subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964); quoting Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 275 (1960). In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court held the
double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, thus overruling Palko, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
In addition to overruling the basis of Bartkus' first basis, the scope of the dual sovereignty
rule was diminished. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 387 U.S. 52 (1964) (rejecting the
rule that a jurisdiction granting a witness immunity can require testimony which might be
given to another jurisdiction for prosecution); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)
91
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ests. Solutions to the successive prosecutions problem thus fall into
two categories involving conflicting assumptions: (1) the Bartkus-Abbate rule is constitutional; and (2) the Barkus-Abbate rule is
unconstitutional.
A.

The Bartkus-Abbate Rule Is Constitutional

This position adopts the Supreme Court's stance on the issue.
Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, courts have held that when a
man commits an act made illegal by two sovereigns, he has committed two distinct offenses. 9 6 These courts reason that "an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an
offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished
by each."' 97 But, the peace and dignity referred to does not belong to
each sovereign, it represents society's interest given to two sovereigns-federal and state governments-to protect. Thus, the BartkusAbbate rule overemphasizes defendant's interests. Fairness to defendants requires that courts or Congress impose limitations on successive
prosecutions. The Model Penal Code98 and the New Federal Criminal Code 99 both attempt to solve this problem.
1. The Model Penal Code
The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) published the Model Penal
Code (M.P.C.) in 1962.100 Section 1.10 of the M.P.C.'s Proposed O ca Draft, entitled Former Prosecutions in Another Jurisdiction:
When A Bar, states:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of the State and of the United States or another State, a
prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in acquittal or in a convic(overruling the doctrine which permitted evidence illegally seized by state officials to be used
in federal prosecutions as long as federal officers had not participated in the search).
If Justice Harlan is correct in his assertion that "[t]his Court has. . . abolished the two
sovereignties rule," Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 250 (1966) (dissenting opinion), then the
policy arguments behind successive prosecutions are nonexistent. Once courts balance the
interests of federalism against the defendant's individual rights, the Bartkus-Abbate rule is left
as a constitutional anachronism.
96 See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
97 Id at 382.
98 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
99 FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (Proposed Draft, Title 18, United States Code) § 707
(1971).
100 The American Law Institute submitted the Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code at the thirty-ninth annual meeting in May 1962.
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tion. . . and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (a) [the first prosecution and the subsequent
prosecution] each requires proof of a fact not required by the other
and the law defining each [offense] is intended to prevent a substantially different harm. . . or (b) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) The [first prosecution resulted in an acquittal]. . . which
• . .necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact
which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the
defendant is subsequently prosecuted.lt
The proposed statute requires that the Court decide (1) whether to
apply the federal courts "same evidence" test 10 2 and (2), if so,
whether the basis of the prosecution is the same in both prosecutions.
Under the "same evidence" test, a court will not bar a successive
conviction if one offense requires proof of facts not required by another. Paragraph (1)(a), however, goes one step beyond this test. It
states that despite the test's application, a prosecution for one offense
will still bar a prosecution for the other if both prosecutions were
intended to prevent substantially the same harm. 0 3 By adding this
limitation to the "same evidence" test, the M.P.C. forces courts to

examine society's interests as well as the offenses' technical elements.
Once a court has decided to apply the sarie evidence test, it
must then decide whethpr the conduct of the second prosecution is
the same as the first. The M.P.C.'s test should be interpreted liberally because it gives defendants more protection. The Code's drafters
intended the "same conduct" test to remedy the problem that most
criminal conduct consists of more than a single act.' 0 4 The drafters
also have given federal courts the discretion to expand the "same
101

MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (emphasis added).
102 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Federal courts use the "Blockburger rule" in determining whether the defendant's act created two offenses. .The Blockburger
rule states: "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. .. ." Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). Accord, Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911);
Carter v. McClaughery, 183 U.S. 365, 395 (1901); Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433,
434 (1871). See also Note, DoubleJeopardy: Multiple ProsecutionsArisingFrom the Same Transaction,
15 Am.CRIM. L. REv. 259 (1978).

103 Section 1.10(1) provides that a court bar a successive prosecution where the first prosecution resulted in acquittal and the second prosecution's basis is the same conduct, unless, "the
law defining each [offense] is intended to prevent a substantiall diffirent hann." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.10(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [emphasis added]. The drafters, therefore,
gave weight to the conduct's similarity and the statutes' purposes.
,104
MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment § 1.10, (Tentative Draft No. 5-6, 1956).
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10 5
conduct" test to a true "same transaction" test.
Since the A.L.I. drafted the Model Penal Code so flexibly, it is
conceivable that it could also protect the defendant more than the
constitution requires. This would occur if the courts interpret the
phrase "same conduct" as barring a second prosecution, even if the
offense violated a different societal interest. 106 Under this interpretation, the courts would look at the whole transaction; if the defendant
was prosecuted for any part of the transaction, that would bar a subsequent prosecution. Even with this liberal interpretation, the Model
Penal Code does not deal with the problem as comprehensively as
the New Federal Criminal Code.

The New Federal Criminal Code
Congress established the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws ("the Commission") in 1966 to review and to
recommend revisions of federal criminal laws. The Commission published its research and recommendations in its Working Papers,
which contain several comprehensive reviews of present criminal law
and procedure. 107 The Working Papers provided the legal basis and
policy foundations for the Commission's New Federal Criminal Code
("the Code"). 108 Sections 707 and 708 of the Commission's proposed
Code represent Congress' attempt to deal comprehensively with the
successive prosecutions problem.
Section 707 provides a general legislative policy on the question:
When conduct constitutes a federal offense and an offense under
the law of a local government. . . , a prosecution by the local gov2.

105 The "same transaction" test bars a second prosecution if the trial judge determines
that the offenses are part of the same criminal transaction. See 2 DE PAUL L. REv. 263, 267
(1952). The case establishing the "same transaction" test involved a defendant who ignited a
building, killing a person inside. State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490 (Sup. Ct.
1833). The "same transaction" test is favorable to a defendant since it is harder for a prosecutor to distinguish separate crimes during a continuous transaction than it is to select an uncommon element as a reason for justifying a second prosecution under the "same evidence"
test.
106 The Reporter at the American Law Institute Proceedings noted: [T]he purpose [of
section 1.10] is to give the courts some leeway to expand the scope of the protection in dealing
with criminality if it involves a succession of acts, but to do so in relation to what it conceives
to be the policy of double jeopardy. . . . MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment § 1.10 (Tentative
Draft No. 5-6, 1956).
107 The Commission presented its Working Papers to Congress in its Final Report pursuant to Section 8 of Public Law 89-801, as amended by Public Law 91-39. The Commission
submitted the Final Report as a proposed revision of Title 18, United States Code, upon
which Congress could undertake the necessary reform of the federal criminal laws.
108 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report: A Proposed New Federal Criminal CodeTitle 18, United States Code (1971).
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ernment is a bar to a subsequent federal prosecution under either of
the following circumstances: (a) the first prosecution. . . and the
subsequent prosecution [are] based on the same conduct or arose
from the same criminal episode, unless (i) [the laws of the two jurisdictions are] intended to protect substantially different harm or evil
. . . or (ii) the second offense was not consummated when the first
trial began; or (b) the first prosecution was terminated by an acquittal. . . which necessarily required a determination inconsistent
with a fact or legal proposition which must be established for the
conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently
prosecuted; unless the Attorney General of the United States certifies that the interests of the United States would be unduly harmed
if the federal prosecution is barred. 10 9

The Commission's solution to successive prosecutions is almost
identical to the M.P.C.'slo solution. The New Federal Criminal
Code creates a presumptive bar against successive prosecutions and
requires a judicial assessment of the facts."' Section 707 also instructs the Attorney General to determine the federal government's
112
interests in the issue.
In applying the Model Penal Code formulation, however, the
Commission failed to develop a standard dealing with the Code's
problem of defining those situations where the subsequent federal
109 FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 707 (Proposed Draft, 1971) [emphasis added]. Section
707 applies only to the Abbate situation-a federal prosecution following a state prosecution.
The Commission, in drafting § 707, considered federal supremacy in granting the Attorney
General discretionary power to proceed. Id § 707 Comment.
Section 708 applies only to the Bartkus situation--a state prosecution following a federal
prosecution. Section 708 is similar to § 707 except that in § 708 the state has no discretionary
power and thus an absolute bar exists against successive prosecutions. Commission members,
while not in disagreement with the section, favored its deletion because they doubted its constitutionality. These members also argued that as a matter of comity, it is preferable to leave
the matter to the states rather than force Congressional action upon them.
110 The Model Penal Code permits a second prosecution only if the second prosecution
either is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or the second prosecution has not
been consummated when the first trial begins. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
111 Section 708(a) of the new Federal Criminal Code bars a local prosecution after a federal prosecution based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, regardless of the
Blockburger "same evidence" rule, unless the statutes defining the offenses are intended to
prevent a substantially different harm or evil, or the second offense was not consummated
when the first trial begins. Ste FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 708(a) (Proposed Draft, 1971).
112 The National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws recommended
codification of the Petite policy, because of the policy's "generally successful experience." See
id § 707 Comment. The Commission's recommendation, however, has not been followed.
Senate Committee on lheJudiciaq, S. 1437.As Reported With Amendments, S. REP. No. 95-605, 95th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
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Although the Code has

adopted a "same conduct or same transaction" test,"

4

it is still un-

clear whether the facts alleged in each prosecution must be literally
the same or whether the subsequent prosecution need only arise from
the same transaction. 1 5 This distinction is vital in light of courts
narrow interpretation of criminal provisions. 116
Section 707 also departs from the Model Penal Code by codifying existing federal practice, the Petite policy. 17 Codification of the
Petite policy as an exception to the general rule against successive
prosecutions provides defendants with enforceable statutory rights
and diminishes the opportunities for prosecutorial impropriety."18
Invoking the exception insures that the matter receives careful attention at the governmental policymaking level; in that the Attorney
General authorizes the prosecution. Where the Attorney General
does not authorize the prosecution, a court must bar the prosecution.
Invoking this exception, however, requires two steps: (1) the
Attorney General must certify to the district court that governmental
interests would be unduly and substantially damaged if the court
bars the federal prosecution; and (2) the court must determine that
the federal statute is aimed at harm substantially different from that
of the statute under which the state prosecution is brought. Although the Commission's standard of undue and substantial harm
may be vague, the clause is not designed to provide a definitional
standard for determining when to prosecute. Rather, it provides for
a case-by-case consideration of the government interests involved.
The clause gives federal prosecutors appropriate discretion, while still
stressing that the Government meet a high standard. Congressional
113 The Commission did not adopt the Blockburger "same evidence" rule employed by the
Model Penal Code and federal courts. For a brief discussion of the test see note 101 supra.
114 The proposed Federal Criminal Code provides a bar to successive prosecutions if the
second prosecution is "based on the same conduct or arose from the same criminal episode" as
the first. FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 707(a) (Proposed Draft, 1971).
115 See notes 101 and 104supra (discussion of the "same evidence" and "same transaction"
tests). If no requirement exists that the facts alleged in each prosecution be the same, then the
scope of the "same conduct" test will be broader that the Blockburger rule adopted by the
Model Penal Code.
116 See Note, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 259, supra note 101, at 260.
117 The Petite policy is an internal administrative policy of the Justice Department requiring prosecutorial self-restraint in cases of successive prosecutions. The policy was first announced after Bartkus and Abbate were decided. See note 59 supra for the text of the policy.
118 Courts have held that the Petite policy, as an internal administrative guideline, does
not create any rights in the defendant. Therefore, codification of the Petite policy would give
defendants the right to use the policy as a defense to successive prosecutions not authorized by
the Attorney General. Elevating the Petite policy to a statutory right also subjects it to judicial review, requiring more uniformity and scrutiny by federal prosecutors.
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enactment of Section 707 would statutorily provide a presumptive
bar against successive prosecutions. A determination of the facts, the
evidence, and the different governmental interests involved would be
required before a court could allow a successive prosecution. In
adopting the section 707 bar, however, Congress should design the
tests that courts would use in determining: (1) whether the facts alleged must be literally the same for application of the "same evidence" test; (2) whether the subsequent prosecution need only arise
from the same transaction as the first; (3) what constitutes "same
conduct;" and (4) what distinguishes different governmental
interests.
In determining whether the facts alleged must be literally the
same for application of the "same evidence" test, Congress may
choose to adopt either the Blockburger rule' ' 9 -the facts alleged in
each prosecution must be the same-or a broader definition of "same
evidence." Although federal courts have adopted the Blockburger
rule, 120 a broader "same evidence" test would better protect the
defendant.
The New Federal Criminal Code bars a successive prosecution
arisingfrom the same ciminal episode.121 In determining what constitutes 'arising from,' Congress should adopt the "same transaction"
test. The "same transaction" test bars a second prosecution if the
trial judge determines that the offenses are part of the same criminal
transaction. The "same transaction" test would be more favorable to
a defendant since it is difficult for a prosecutor to distinguish separate
22
crimes during a continuous transaction.
The New Federal Criminal Code also bars a successive prosecution based on the defendant's same conduct, but does not define
same conduct. The drafters explained only that 'same conduct' does
not include 'criminal conduct which was not consummated when the
first trial began. ' 123 If Congress adopts sections 707 and 708, it
should define 'same conduct' as either the defendant's same act or
the same transaction. Adopting the same transaction test would pro119
120
121

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 707 (Proposed Draft, 1971).
See Note, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 259, note 101 supra.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §§ 707, 708 (Proposed Draft, 1971).

122 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
123 If the Supreme Court overruled Bartkuw and Abbate, the double jeopardy clause would
bar successive prosecutions because:
(1) the fifth amendment would bar the federal government from prosecuting after
a state prosecution; and (2) the fourteenth amendment, incorporating the fifth
amendment to the states, would bar the state government from prosecuting after a
federal prosecution.
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mote prosecutorial efficiency by requiring the prosecutor to join all
the criminal acts and prosecute the most serious crime.
Sections 707 and 708 allow successive prosecutions, notwithstanding that the second prosecution's basis is the same conduct or
the same criminal episode, if the two statutes are 'intended to protect
substantially different harm[s].' In determining what constitutes different harms, Congress should state that a government interest in
protecting against harm supports a second prosecution only where
that interest is not vindicated by the first prosecution and is within
the traditional jurisdiction of that sovereign.
B.

The Bartkus-Abbate Rule Is Unconstitutional

The second line of analysis is based on the position that the Bartkus-Abbate rule is unconstitutional. Commentators have criticized
the rule as constitutionally faulty. They argue that Bartkus and Abbate should be overruled because of the decisions' precedent and the
dual sovereignty doctrine's erosion.12 4 If Bartkus and Abbate are overruled, the double jeopardy clause would bar successive prosecutions
between two sovereigns.

125

If the double jeopardy clause bars successive prosecutions, however, one government conceivably could use double jeopardy to nullify the other government's laws. 126 In UnitedStates v. Lanza,127 Chief
Justice Taft warned that a double jeopardy bar would give states the
power to preempt federal law: "the race of offenders to the courts of
that State to plead guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not make for respect for the federal statute
or for its deterrent effect." 128 Justice Frankfurter, in Bartkus, also
considered potential nullification: (1) one government's statute
could impose small or nominal penalties in comparison to the other
government's severer strictures;1 29 and (2) the first government's
prosecutors could prosecute ineptly, causing acquittal or nominal
sentencing. 1

30

Nullification is a valid concern in situations like Southern states'
124 See Note, 31 STAN. L. REV. 477, supra note 71, at 487 (discussing problems raised by
nullification).
125 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
126 Id at 381.
127 359 U.S. at 137.
128 Id at 138.
129 See Note 80 HARv. L. REv. 1538, supra note 92, at 1551 (discussing civil rights offenses
as paradigm cases of obstructive state action).
130 See Note, Pre-emtplion as a PreferentialGround- A New Canon of Constretion, 12 STAN. L.
REv. 208 (1959).
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prosecutions of civil rights violations. Nullification's potential harm
in civil rights cases is exemplified by ineffective state action, lack of
cooperation between state and federal authorities, and local
prejudice obstructing the vindication of important federal
31

interests. 1
Federal preemption of the state government's prosecution might

solve the nullification problem if the double jeopardy clause barred
successive prosecutions. 132 Preemption seems appropriate, however,

only when the interest protected is predominantly national and state
involvement would disrupt the federal scheme. 133 When the federal
statute concerns a field affecting state interests, preemption deprives
a state of the power to vindicate its interests when federal authorities
do not prosecute. Moreover, a significant increase in the scope of
exclusive jurisdiction would require expanding the federal police
force, duplicating some expenses, hindering federal-state cooperation,
and perhaps eroding state responsibility. 134
131 See Note, Pre-emption By Federal CriminalStatutes, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 83 (1955).
132 Mr. Walter Fisher, Bartkus' court-appointed attorney, proposed that Congress adopt
preemption as a remedy to successive prosecutions. Fisher stated that Congress might "surely
take over the field to the limited extent of insisting that federal officials be given the right to
do the prosecuting." Brief for Petitioner, p. 61. Fisher addressed the implementation of his
preemption solution by applying it to a bank robbery example: In a jurisdiction where the
state prosecutions for the robbery of federally insured banks were being conducted inefficiently, if Congress could totally divest states of authority to prosecute. Thus requiring federal trials for virtually all bank robberies in the United States, since almost every bank is
federally insured.
Fisher also suggested a second, less extreme measure requiring[T]hat no state prosecution for federal bank robbery shall be commenced until, say,
thirty days after notifying the United States Attorney, so that he may have an
opportunity to try the accused if he wishes the trial to be a federal rather than a
state trial. Such a statute would assure a federal trial when and where deemed
needed to forestall either an interfering state trial or a race to the courts. But [and
Fisher recognized-at least implicitly-that this was precisely the difficulty with
addressing such an argument to a court in a constitutional controversy] that is up to
Congress to decide.
See MILLER, supra note 22, at 69.
133 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) restricts federal courts from granting injunctions to stay state
court proceedings. Section 2283, however, has been held inapplicable (1) where Congress
expressly directs the federal court to stay a state court proceeding notwithstanding § 2283;
and (2) where the United States as a party to the action seeks the stay. Leiter v. United
States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957). See alo NLRB v. Nash-Finch, 404 U.S. 138 (1971) (holding that
an administrative agency of the United States is the United States for purposes of the Leiter
exception).
134 Congressional adoption of selective preemption requires: (1) federal criminal statutes
to expressly state that they preempt the states, and (2) a definition of what types of cases
involve national interest. Defining what constitutes national interest is not limited to any set
criteria. However, examples of where national interest does and does not exist may be helpful. Ineffective prosecutions of civil rights violations by the states is an example where na-
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The best way to protect national interests, while disallowing successive prosecutions, is "selective preemption." Selective preemption
would allow federal officers to enjoin a state prosecution if a federal
trial was necessary to protect national interests. This solution would
avoid the problems of state's rights and nullifications. States would
retain primary responsibility for law enforcement and protect the
federal government against local prejudice and incompetency in
prosecution. It would also bring the federal government's full resources into play in cases of national interest.
IV.

Conclusion

The Barkus-Abbate rule unnecessarily denies defendants double
jeopardy protection in successive prosecutions. The rule's basis is the
dual sovereignty theory: our federal system created two sovereigns to
protect society and each sovereign may prosecute to vindicate the
same interest-in effect trying a man twice for the same offense. The
United States Justice Department made a good faith effort to protect
defendants in successive prosecutions through the Petite policy. However, the Petite policy lacks clarity, is haphazardly applied and is not
subject to judicial review.
The Model Penal Code and the New Federal Criminal Code
have proposed solutions to the problem of successive prosecutions.
These statutory proposals, however, have not been adopted by
Congress.
Although use of administrative discretion and "barring statutes"
might restore the defendant's fifth amendment rights, selective preemption is the best solution. Allowing federal prosecutors to enjoin a
state prosecution where a federal trial is necessary to protect national
interests will give primary law enforcement responsibility to the
states while protecting against local prejudice and incompetency.
Federal preemption could be implemented through Congressional
adoption or through the use of the federal government's power to
tional interests are not vindicated. The ability of the states to nullify national interests
through inept prosecution, nominal sentencing, or lack of state and federal cooperation, justifies invoking a power to preempt state prosecution. Sections 659, 660, 1992, and 2117 of Title
18 of the United States Code are examples of federal determinations that no supreme national interest exists. In these sections, Congress has stated that: "A judgment of conviction
or acquittal under the laws of any state shall be a bar to any prosecution hereunder for the
same act or acts." 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660 (embezzlement and theft from intrastate shipments);
§ 1992 (willful damage to interstate carriers); § 2117 (breaking or entering interstate carrier's
facilities).
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enjoin state proceedings to prevent "irreparable injury to a national
interest."
With the protection of both federal and state interests by selective preemption, there no longer exists a justification for the BarkutsAbbate rule. The extreme criticisms of the Bartkus-Abbate rule, the attacks on its precedents, and erosion of dual sovereignty should encourage the Supreme Court to overrule Bartkus and Abbate. In doing
so the Court will return to the defendant the fifth amendment protection that he should not "be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy."
Ophelia S. Camifia

